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Relational Incentives  
in Chinese Family Firms 
 
Summary: This paper mainly discusses the choice of managerial compensa-
tion contracts in Chinese family firms. Relation or guanxi in Chinese language
is an important factor that should be considered because it can bring the shirk-
ing cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under
Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”). Our theoretical
analysis shows that under some conditions it is optimal for the owner to choose
the efficiency wage contract, and that under other conditions it is optimal for the
owner to choose the share-based incentive contract.
Key words: Managerial compensation, Efficiency wage contract, Share-based 
incentive contract, Relation (Guanxi), Chinese family firm. 






This paper focuses mainly on one of specific decesions of Chinese family firms. Al-
though there is no unified definition of the family firm, according to well-known 
Wikipedia, “A family business is a business in which one or more members of one or 
more families have a significant ownership interest and significant commitments to-
ward the business’ overall well-being.” As far as Chinese family firms are concerned, 
“one or more members of one or more families” usually belong to the same clan. 
China’s private-owned enterprises, especially family firms, play a substantial role in 
the course of China’s miraculous economic development (Martin Whyte 1995; Alis-
tair Anderson et al. 2003; Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian 2005), which 
can be vividly demonstrated by the famous Wenzhou Mode or the more generalized 
Zhejiang Mode. The reason why these family firms could work so effectively is still 
remained as a blackbox. In order to open this blackbox, we should focus our attention 
on the internal organization of Chinese family firms. Just as the Nobel Prize laureate 
Ronald Coase and his collaborator point out, incentives and relation are indispensible 
for the successful operation of these firms (Ronald Coase and Ning Wang 2010). In 
Chinese family firms, relation or guanxi in Chinese language is an important factor 
that should be considered in the choice of managerial incentive contracts. However, 
to the best of my knowledge, there is almost no literature paying attention to the 
choice of relation-based managerial compensation contracts. This paper tries to fill 
the gap between the relation and the managerial incentives. 
There are two strands of literature which are related to our paper. The first 
strand of literature focuses on the managerial compensation, which can be classified 
into at least two views (Lucian Bebchuk and Michael Weisbach 2010). One view 
centers on the optimal contracting (e. g., Bengt Holmstrom 1979), and the other view  
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concentrates on the managerial power (e. g., Bebchuk and Jesse Fried 2003). Accord-
ing to these two views, when the owner of a Chinese family firm hires a manager to 
operate his firm, he faces two serious opportunistic problems because of the lack of 
the effective constraints derived from manager and capital markets. One problem is 
that the manager may try to shirk, and the other problem is that the manager may 
misuse his delegated power. In order to solve these two problems, the owner of the 
family firm has found some institutional arrangements to improve on his bad situa-
tions, which conforms to the finding of Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Andrei Shleifer (1999). One of these institutional arrangements is the so-called 
discrimination mechanism in the Chinese cultural background, which allows the 
owner’s family member at the same job-position with the hired manager (Minglin 
Wang and Shengchun Zhou 2005; Jiancai Pi 2008, 2010). In this way, the owner’s 
family member can act as a monitor in general sense. The role of the monitor has 
been deeply analyzed by Ronald Dye (1986), Roger Congleton (1989), Roland 
Strausz (1997) and others, especially in the three-layer principal-agent cases. Another 
of these institutional arrangements is the introduction of relation-based manager, 
which is just the focus of this paper. 
The second strand of literature focuses on the relation-based governance 
(Shuhe Li 2003; Shaomin Li, Seung Ho Park, and Li 2004), which holds that implicit 
agreements based on relation play an important role in determining the eventual en-
forcement outcome. Li (2003) uses the term relation in the sense that the two parties 
concerned share certain relevant private information about one another locally, which 
includes ex ante, interim, and ex post monitoring information honoring the contract. 
According to the analysis of Avinash Dixit (2003), the relation-based governance 
could be treated as self-governance, which is widely modelled as equlubria in re-
peated interactions (Michihiro Kandori 1992; Avner Greif 1993, 1994; Glenn Ellison 
1994). Li (2003) and Li, Ho Park, and Li (2004) highlight that the relation-based so-
ciety has some difficulty in transition to the rule-based society, and they view the 
relation from a macro-perspective. However, they neglect the relation in Chinese 
family firms at a micro-level. This paper extends their analytical target from the 
whole society to the family firms. We find that the relr5ation-based governance in 
Chinese family firms has a specific functioning mechanism, which has been greatly 
neglected by the existent literature. 
The basic idea of this paper is as follows. Since the majority of Chinese family 
firms are engaged in processing and manufacturing industries, they eagerly need 
managerial abilities when they grow bigger and bigger and particularly reach a criti-
cal scale (Michael Carney 1998). However, the hired manager has serious moral haz-
ard problems due to the deficiencies of law and formal contract enforcement just as 
we have previously analyzed. In order to reduce the degree of managerial opportunis-
tic behavior, the owner of the family firm has to resort to hiring the relation-based 
manager. At the same time, in order to better incentivize the relation-based manager, 
the owner of the family firm has to pick out the optimal managerial compensation 
contract. There are two popular managerial compensation contracts in Chinese fam-
ily firms. One is the so-called efficiency wage contract, which specifies that good 
performance implies high managerial compensation and that bad performance means  
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low managerial compensation and can be seen as a relatively high-powered incentive 
arrangement. The other is the so-called share-based incentive contract, which speci-
fies the appropriate proportion that the owner and the relation-based manager obtain 
and can be regarded as a relatively low-powered incentive arrangement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 is the basic setup. Sec-
tion 2 provides the model of the efficiency wage contract. Section 3 offers the model 
of the share-based incentive contract. Section 4 conducts a comparative analysis of 
the two different models. Some concluding remarks are made in Section 5. 
 
1. The Basic Setup 
 
In this section, we follow Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort’s (2002) ana-
lytical framework. It is assumed that the relation-based manager is risk-neutral. If he 
exerts effort level  {0,1} e , the firm’s added-value will be V  with probability 
() e  , and V  with probability 1( ) e   , where 0( ) 1 e    . When the relation-
based manager’s performance is good, he can get a bonus, which may be a desirable 
efficiency wage or an appropriate share; however, when his performance is bad, he 
will not be punished, which signifies he is protected by limited liability. When he 
exerts no effort, his effort cost is  0
G  . The traditional literature usually sets  0 0
G  
because it does not consider the existence of Chinese-style mutual relation. However, 
we set  0 0
G , which reflects that there is some kind of spiritual and psychological 
cost when the relation-based manager shirks. For expositional ease, we call this cost 
the shirking cost throughout the paper. In essence, the shirking cost in this paper is 
similar to the uneasiness cost which is defined by Pi (2011). When he exerts effort, 
his effort cost is  1 0
G   . The superscript G  denotes relation (or guanxi in 
Chinese language), and the subscripts 0 and 1 represent  0 e   and  1 e  , respec-
tively. We assume that  0
G  , which implies that for the relation-based manager, 
exerting effort without the pricks of conscience brings more disutility than shirking 
with guilt at having fallen short of the owner’s expectations. The following mathe-
matical definitions should be noted,  1 (1)    ,  0 (0)    ,  10 0     , 
0 VVV ,  0 V  . 
There are two types of contracts that the owner of the family firm can choose 
from, either an efficiency wage contract or a share-based incentive contract. The 
Chinese-style relation is two-way. That is to say, the owner and the relation-based 
manager are tied down to the mutual relation.  
Firstly, we consider the case of the efficiency wage contract. When the rela-
tion-based manager’s performance is good, he will get a high efficiency wage  0 t  . 
When the relation-based manager’s performance is bad, he will get a low efficiency 
wage  0 t  , where  tt  . Although the owner must comply with the efficiency 
wage contract in order to incentivize the manager, he bears some kind of spiritual 
and psychological cost resulting from the relation when the relation-based manager  
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only gets a low efficiency wage. We suppose that this cost is 
G c , where  0
G c  . For 
the sake of ease of exposition, we call this cost the caring cost throughout the paper. 
Secondly, we consider the case of the share-based incentive contract. When 
the owner and the relation-based manager sign a share-based incentive contract, the 
owner gets 1    proportion and the relation-based manager obtains   proportion, 
where 01   . All the other stipulations are similar to those under the efficiency 
wage contract except that there does not exist 
G c  to the owner at all under the share-
based incentive contract. 
Here, some points about the conception of the shirking cost ( 0
G  ) and the car-
ing cost (
G c ) should be noted. First, these two costs based on relation are related to 
Xiaotong Fei’s (2008) Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”), 
which is a multi-dimensional structure containing ego-centered relational distances. 
According to Fei (2008, p. 28), “In Chinese society, the most important relation is 
similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is thrown into a lake. 
...Everyone stands at the center of the circles produced by his own social influence. 
Everyone’s circles are interrelated. One touches different circles at different times 
and places.” Second, these two costs vary directly with relational distances. Third, 
different costs correspond to different relational distances, and hence different types 
of managers and owners. In a well-known economic terminology, these costs are 
common knowledge between the managers and owners. Fourth, Chinese-style differ-
ential mode of association (“chaxu geju”) is rooted in Chinese culture, and reflects a 
special kind of personhood. In a word, these two costs in this paper are used to cap-
ture the particular cultural backgound in China. 
Furthermore, the shirking cost ( 0
G  ) can be seen as a proxy for the relation-
based manager’s reduced degree of moral hazard. The larger the shirking cost, the 
higher the relation-based manager’s reduced degree of moral hazard. When  0 0
G   , the 
relation-based manager is equivalent to a nonrelation-based manager who is hired 
from a professional manager market. Similarly, the caring cost (
G c ) can be seen as a 
proxy for the owner’s degree of altruism. The larger the caring cost, the higher the 
owner’s degree of altruism. When  0
G c  , the owner is completely selfish. 
Without loss of generality, no matter when it is under an efficiency wage con-
tract or under a share-based incentive contract, the fixed salary of the relation-based 
manager is normalized to zero. This normalization can simplify our analysis to the 
most degree. 
The timing of the principal-agent game is as follows. 
(i) At t=1, the owner offers an efficiency wage contract or a share-based in-
centive contract to the the relation-based manager; 
(ii) At t=2, the relation-based manager rejects or accepts the offer; 
(iii) At t=3, the hired relation-based manager chooses an effort, which is either 
1 or 0; 
(iv) At t=4, the firm’s added-value is realized; 
(v) At t=5, the signed contract is enforced. 
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2. Efficiency Wage Contract 
 
According to Section 1, when it is under the efficiency wage contract, the program-
ming problem will be: 
 
11 {( , )} max ( ) (1 )( )
G
tt Vt Vtc       
 
.. st    11 00 0 (1 ) (1 )
G tttt                     (1)
 
11 (1 ) 0 tt         (2a)
 
00 0 (1 ) 0
G tt        (2b)
 
0 t    (3)
 
 (1), (2a, b), and (3) are the relation-based manager’s incentive compatibility, 
participation, and limited liability constraints, respectively. 
According to the standard incentive theory, it is easy for us to find that con-
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The superscript  * E  stands for second-best state under the efficiency wage 
contract. 
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G c ,   , and  0
G   are three parameters which are of relevance for our comparative 
analysis in Section 4. Through comparative statics, we can obtain Proposition 1. 
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  , then from (9), we obtain: 
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Proposition 1 implies that 
* E
P U  strictly decreases with 
G c , and weakly de-
creases with  , but is uncertain with regard to  0
G  . 
 
3. Share-Based Incentive Contract 
 
According to Section 1, when it is under the share-based incentive contract, the pro-
gramming problem will be: 
 
11 max(1 )( (1 ) ) VV
      
 
.. st    11 00 0 (( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) )
G VV VV              (10)
 
11 (( 1 ) ) 0 VV         (11a)
 
00 0 (( 1 ) ) 0
G VV         (11b)
 
 (10) and (11a, b) are the relation-based manager’s incentive compatibility and 
participation constraints, respectively. 
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), and that constraint (11b) is binding when  
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The superscript  * S  stands for second-best state under the share-based incen-
tive contract. 












, then the owner’s equilibrium utility will be: 
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  and  0
G   are two parameters related to our comparative analysis in Section 
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Proposition 2 implies that 
* S
P U  weakly decreases with  , but is uncertain 
with regard to  0
G  . 
 
4. A Comparative Analysis 
 
In this section, we will conduct a comparative analysis between the outcomes under 
the efficiency wage contract and those under the share-based incentive contract. It is 













. So, there are only three 
distinct interesting cases that should be paid attention to. According to Propositions 1 
and 2, during the course of our comparative analysis, we should focus our attention 
on 
G c ,  , and  0
G  . 
By comparison, it is easy for us to obtain the following three propositions. 
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, then from (9) and (15), we obtain: 
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From Proposition 3, we know that when the relation-based manager’s shirking 











), the owner tends to choose the 
share-based incentive contract.  
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that when the relation-based manager’s 
reduced degree of moral hazard is high, the owner had better adopt the relatively 
low-powered incentive arrangement, namely the share-based incentive contract. 
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From Proposition 4, we know that when the relation-based manager’s shirking 
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choose the efficiency wage contract if his caring cost is sufficiently small (namely, 
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), and tends to choose the share-
based incentive contract if his caring cost is sufficiently large (namely, 














The intuition behind Proposition 4 is that when the relation-based manager’s 
reduced degree of moral hazard is moderate and the owner’s degree of altruism is 
low, the owner had better adopt the relatively high-powered incentive arrangement, 
namely the efficiency wage contract, and that when the relation-based manager’s 
reduced degree of moral hazard is moderate and the owner’s degree of altruism is 
high, the owner had better adopt the relatively low-powered incentive arrangement, 
namely the share-based incentive contract. 
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From Proposition 5, we know that when the relation-based manager’s shirking 
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The intuition behind Proposition 5 is that when the relation-based manager’s 
reduced degree of moral hazard is low and the owner’s degree of altruism is also low, 
the owner had better adopt the relatively high-powered incentive arrangement, 
namely the efficiency wage contract, and that when the relation-based manager’s 
reduced degree of moral hazard is low and the owner’s degree of altruism is high, the 
owner had better adopt the relatively low-powered incentive arrangement, namely 
the share-based incentive contract. 
According to Propositions 3, 4, and 5, we can draw a conclusion that both the 
shirking cost and the caring cost paly a certain role in the choice of managerial com-
pensation contracts in Chinese family firms. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we mainly discuss the choice of managerial compensation contracts in 
Chinese family firms through an improved principal-agent framework. According to 
Oliver Williamson (1996), there is a fundamental difference between the institutional 
environment and the institutions of governance, as the former places a curb on the 
latter. In this paper, the managerial compensation contracts are the institutions of 
governance, while the imperfect manager and capital markets are the institutional 
environment in Williamson’s sense. It is the external environment that determines the 
internal incentives of family firms (Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, and Andrei 
Shleifer 2003) and the feasible actions of family firms (Michael Young et al. 2008). 
Relation is an important factor that should be considered in the choice of managerial 
incentive contracts. The reason why relation is very important is that it can bring the 
shirking cost to the relation-based manager and the caring cost to the owner under 
Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”). Under some condi-
tions, it is optimal for the owner to choose the efficiency wage contract. However, 
under other conditions, it is optimal for the owner to choose the share-based incen-
tive contract. In Alfred Chandler’s (1977, 1990) language, it is the market pressure 
that constitutes a major driving force for the family firm to adopt suitable managerial 
compensation contracts. Siu-lun Wong (1985) argues that Chinese family firms tend 
to take different incentive structures at various stages of their developmental cycle, 
which is consistent with our theoretical analysis. In summary, this paper studies the 
interactions between informal relation and formal incentives. Understanding these 
interactions is of considerable interest for both academic researchers and policy mak-
ers. 
By introducing the conception of the shirking cost and the caring cost under 
Chinese-style differential mode of association (“chaxu geju”), we can obtain differ-
ent types of managers and owners. The corresponding mathematical treatment 
method in this paper is greatly different from Dixit (2003) and other existent litera-
ture, which may be used as a benchmark framework to deal with the relation-based 
governance in the future research. 
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